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Mercury has been one of the most persistent cases in contemporary history of international market regulations 
and this in spite of its having been affected by important technological changes and the regular discovery of new 
deposits. This paper offers an approach to the least known period, although perhaps the one in which the greatest 
rises in process and production occurred as a consequence of market manipulation. The period coincides with 
a series of agreements between the Spanish and the Italian producers and the outcome was a worldwide cartel 
known as “Mercurio Europeo” which came into being in 1928. The aims of this work will, therefore, be first to 
describe the features of the various stages of development of the international mercury market during the first half 
of the twentieth century, with emphasis on the characteristics and conditioning factors in each period. Secondly, 
the objective is to analyze the various market agreements that came about, the effectiveness of the clauses therein, 
the construction of distribution networks and the influence that the increase in production had on other mines and 
on certain technological developments.
Miguel A. López-Morell is Associate Professor at the Universidad de Murcia. He can be reached via e-mail at 
mlmorell@um.es.
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 Recent years have seen studies and research on 
cartels attracting wider numbers of scholars. The rel-
evance of the subject is most probably proportional 
to the increasing difficulties of giving an answer to 
some of the questions connected with the functioning 
of the economic system. When even the «Financial 
Times», hardly the most radical enemy of the system 
devotes two series of articles – “Future of Capital-
ism” in 2009 and an even more explicit “Capitalism 
in crisis” in 2012 – in three years to the underlying 
cuases of the economic and financial crisis, and its 
more general consequences, it is clear that there is 
room for a long series of questions about the ratio-
nality of this system, the best ways to reform it, and 
the possible varieties of responses to the reforms. 
Most of the answers put forward underline the need 
for a more rational and coordinated behavior of the 
market, suggesting that the invisible hand sometimes 
seems to be a mere accident of history, and not the 
rule. Divergences emerge when it comes to specify-
ing which instruments and actors should drive and 
regulate the new, more rational behavior of the mar-
ket, and the host of actors – the firms – interpreting 
this new economic script.
Already in the 1920s and 1930s, the wealth of 
literature on cartels was suggesting that they are a 
kind of pragmatic response to the misbehavior and/
or imperfection in the allocation of the factors or in 
the information asymmetry concerning prices and 
markets. According to this interpretation, cartels are 
considered a sort of rational, albeit partial response 
introducing new asymmetries, but in a wider con-
text, the imbalances existing in the market among 
firms. The defensive strategy approach implied in 
the introduction of the cartels did not diminish their 
effectiveness. It simply moved to a different level the 
most dramatic friction of any economic system, the 
conflict of interest existing between producers and 
consumers. In the 1920s and 1930s a large part of 
the public  as well as governments saw the idea that 
the geometric sum between the gains in the social 
and economic stability of the system permitted by 
the cartels among producers and the losses of con-
sumer rights as positive. All institutional actors, both 
private and public, were called to contribute to this 
(supposedly positive) effect. 
From the many possible examples offered by 
history, we select the mercury cartel, given the coin-
cidence of all these actors, and their interconnection. 
The fact that the case study covers a period –from 
the 1920s to the 1950s,  where governments were 
largely involved in the cartel not only as  referees but 
also as players, and that the political and institutional 
regimes swung between democratic and authoritar-
ian, merely adds extra relevance and complexity to 
the example, underlying, if necessary, that the need 
for social and economic stability in a sector, as well 
as at a more general level,  has been a value that all 
kinds of governments, regardless of  color or institu-
tional framework, have shared1.
Mercury has been one of the most persistent cas-
es in contemporary history of international market 
regulations and this in spite of its having been af-
fected by important technological changes and the 
regular discovery of new deposits. This paper offers 
an approach to the least known period, although per-
haps the one in which the greatest rises in process 
and production occurred as a consequence of market 
manipulation. The period coincides with the twilight 
years of the Rothschild family’s control of Spanish 
mercury exports (until 1921), the beginning of the 
exclusive control of  sales by the Board of Directors 
of the Almaden and Arrayanes Mines, and the acqui-
sition of the former Austro-Hungarian mines by the 
second world Italian producer, Monte Amiata. This 
led to a series of agreements between the Spanish 
and the Italian producers, supported by their respec-
tive governments, and the outcome was a worldwide 
cartel known as “MercurioEuropeo” based in Lau-
sanne, which came into being in 1928. Thanks to 
these agreements, the Almaden and the Italian mines 
(Monte Amiata, Siele and Idria) reached productions 
and were able to increase their prices internationally, 
hand in hand, leaving little incentives for outsid-
ers2. It is difficult to find a more evident example of 
1 Liefmann, Robert (1932); Hexner, Ervin (1946); 
Schröter, Harm (1996); Salant, Stephen W. and Levenstein, 
Margaret C. (eds.) (2006); Fear, Jeffrey (2007).
2  On mercury market history see: Sánchez Molero 
(1856), Martín (1980), MacKie-Mason and Pindyck (1987), 
Chastagnaret (2000), Segreto (1991) and López-Morell (2008 
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successful prize and quota cartel over such a long-
term, taking into account a number of outsiders and 
the complexity of a commercial structure that would 
work at the international level3. In addition, in min-
ing activities being in a position to maintain any 
long term cartel is more difficult for a small group of 
suppliers, because high prices and the extraordinary 
profits of the companies involved lead to more mines 
being opened and to the appearance of competition, 
unless there is a substantial difference in extraction 
marginal costs between one and another.
We have very good studies of cartels in cop-
per (Herfindal); diamonds and uranium (Spar); cop-
per (Herfindal); aluminum (Holloway); bromine 
(Levestein) and chrome (Phimister)4. However most 
were worked out using indirect sources. In our case 
we have enjoyed unprecedented sources, in particu-
lar the minutes of MercurioEuropeo deposited at the 
archives of the Fundación Almaden (Almaden Trust), 
as well as those of Monte Amiata company Archives 
(at the Mining Museum in Abbadia S. Salvatore), 
the IRI Historical Archives and the Finmeccanica 
Archives in Rome, the Rothschild Archives in Lon-
don and the National Archives of the United States 
(Department of Commerce).The insight gained from 
access to the insider’s view of the cartel management 
is one of the added values in this work.
Also noteworthy is the origin itself of the 
cartel as it was  promoted and managed by the two 
public concerns; the state was the owner and the en-
trepreneur, some decades before the tendency in de-
veloped and non-developed countries to nationalize 
mining resources5.The Spanish government had an 
extraordinarily long experience in mining Almaden 
(from the XVI Century), but only from 1921, after 
almost a century having transferred their sales to in-
termediaries, like the Rothschilds, did the Treasury 
decide to take the control of all industrial and sale 
and 2013).
3  For a general literature on cartels in business history 
see: Akira Kudo and T. Hara (eds.) (1992), Barjot (ed.) (1994), 
Jones (ed.) (1993), Fear (2007) and Levenstein and Suslow 
(2006), to mention but a few.
4  Other classical studies in international cartel in min-
ing are: Elliot, May, Rowe, Skelton and Wallace (1937), He-
zner (1946) and Great Britain Board of Trade (1976), between 
others.
5 Radetzki (1985).
processes. The Italian case was also connected with 
a state-owned company, Monte Amiata, the most 
important national producer and part of the Instituto 
per la Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI) from 1933 on-
wards, i.e. less than five years after the cartel was 
established.
The aims of this work will, therefore, be first 
to describe the features of the various stages of de-
velopment of the international mercury market dur-
ing the first half of the twentieth century, with em-
phasis on the characteristics and conditioning factors 
in each period. A second objective is to analyze the 
various market agreements that came about, the ef-
fectiveness of the clauses in these, the construction 
of distribution networks and the influence that the 
increase in production had on other mines and on 
certain technological developments.
2.-Background
Since ancient times, mercury had been asso-
ciated with paint (vermilion), cosmetics and medi-
cine, but it really came to the fore in the mid sixteenth 
century when it began to be used in the extraction 
of silver by amalgamation from the huge deposits 
in Peru and Mexico. Up to the end of the nineteenth 
century mercury was employed intensively in the 
Mexican silver mines and its demand would grow 
still more when it was discovered that it could also 
be used in industry for gold-plating, manufacturing 
physical instruments, paints and mirrors, turbine 
manufacture, which made use of its vapours, or as 
fulminating powder. Thus, it gradually ceased to be 
used as an amalgam.
 The second feature of the mercury market lay 
in its scarce supply: the cinnabar from which it is ex-
tracted is rarely found in nature and is concentrated 
in very few mines around the planet, and it was this 
that gave producers a solid argument for imposing 
worldwide prices.
The largest and oldest deposits are in Al-
maden, in the Province of Ciudad Real, in South-
ern Spain, and so it was not difficult for the Span-
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ish crown, the exclusive owner of the deposits from 
1523, to take advantage of its monopoly and to fix an 
exclusive income on the product; in fact, all dealers 
since then have adhered to the Spanish measurement 
of production based on the traditional containers 
(flask) of 34.507 kg. of mercury6. The only compe-
tition to Almaden on the world market for the next 
three centuries came from the mines of Idria, located 
in present day Slovenia. However, the sovereignty of 
the Austrian monarchs over the deposits made it easy 
to reach an agreement for the exclusive sale of sur-
pluses to the Spanish crown. So it was that, barring a 
few isolated years in the eighteenth century, the Idria 
mercury did not compete with Spanish mercury.
This balance of power, an effective duopoly 
which was strengthened by the Rothschild family, 
who had control of the Almaden sales from 1830, 
finished in 1847 with the discovery of the New Al-
maden seam, followed in the ensuing years by others 
such as New Idria (1854), Redington (1861) and Sul-
6  Although the mercury figures are universal there is 
a slight deviation with the North American production, where 
flasks are marginally smaller. Specifically, their flasks weighed 
76 pounds while the Spanish ones were 34.5 Kg, equivalent to 
76.0582 pounds (75 Spanish pounds).
phur Bank (1873), all in California, and some other 
lesser ones in the state of Colorado. For well over a 
decade the USA easily outstripped Spain as leading 
world producer and, even though most of the produc-
tion was for domestic consumption, the existence of 
the Californian mercury upset the market and led to 
drastic falls in prices. 
With the arrival of the twentieth century, and 
especially with the opening of Monte Amiata (1897), 
Italy appeared on the international stage and became 
a point a reference. The conditions of production in 
Italy were completely different. While in Spain the 
technological requirements were lower, and for a 
long time, till the 1920’s, the company was run actu-
ally without a formal industrial accountancy, with the 
Spanish central administration offering the financial 
support for any activity, in Italy the presence of mer-
cury at the surface was just episodic. The entrance 
to the mines was at a height of some 900 meters and 
mining the metal required very modern and efficient 
methods, which was profitable, despite the lower 
percentage of metal in the rocks. The main company, 
Monte Amiata (named after the mountain where the 
mines were located in the South of Tuscany) was set 
up in the late 1890’s by German investors who intro-
1 
 
Graph 1: Accumulated production by countries of mercury in flasks; 
prices ($/Ton), 1800-1936. 
 
Source: Schmitz, C. J. (1979). 
Note: there are no figures for the Austro-Hungary production (Idria mines) from 
1911 to 1919 
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duced the best available technologies, both for min-
ing the mineral and for its industrial transformation.
Italian and Spanish producers were formal 
competitors, but since their markets were geographi-
cally apart (the Italian mercury was sold through 
some German big brokers, Metallgesellschaft and 
Hirsch company, and was exported mainly to that 
area), for a long time they coexisted without interfer-
ing in each other’s main markets. The first important 
and positive contact between the two big producers 
was during WW1. They reached an agreement, under 
the supervision of the British Government, that led 
to an entente between the Rothschilds and the Span-
ish and Italian Governments, with the former selling 
their mercury in London during the war at a ratio of 
one Italian flask per two Spanish flasks, and at a con-
siderably inflated price, which rose from £7 per flask 
in 1914 to £24 in 1918, while in the same years in 
New York it went from $48.31 to $123.477.
 In 1921 the Spanish Government decided not 
to renew its agreement with the Rothschilds but to 
directly organize sales through Board of the Minas 
de Almaden y Arrayanes. The Board was suddenly 
faced with the task of selling all the production, 
something it had been delegating to the Treasury for 
the last 55 years. The challenge seemed clear, since 
although the Rothschild withdrew completely from 
the operations, the remaining intermediaries, led by 
Alexander Pickering, the most important mercury 
broker in London, put pressure on the board to lower 
prices so that they would have more leeway to specu-
late on the markets. The board set up a fixed price 
system at 10.5 pounds the flask. While this did not 
give any net profit to the Spanish Treasury in 1922, 
it did convince the Spanish Government that things 
were going in the right direction, and official prices 
were raised to 12 pounds the flask, a price which held 
until the end of 19258.
Meanwhile, in Italy, as a result of the political 
and military effects of WW1, Monte Amiata com-
7 López-Morell (2008); ASIRI, Serie Rossa.
8 Ibid.
pany passed into the control of the most important 
Italian bank, the Banca Commerciale Italiana. The 
second consequence effect of the end of the war was 
the incorporation into the Italian Kingdom of a small 
part of the Austria-Hungarian territory, including 
the area where the Idria mines were located. These 
mines passed directly into state administration con-
trol. Following the successful war experience, the 
Italian Government tried to reach an initial agree-
ment for joint control of the international market, but 
this did not materialize9. The Italians even sought, 
unsuccessfully, to make a direct agreement with the 
Rothschilds in 1920, when prices started to plummet 
(in spite of a reduction in world production to barely 
75,500 flasks) due largely to Italy, which was putting 
its mercury on the market below the official prices10.
Some months later, when the Almaden mer-
cury sales were firmly controlled by the Spanish 
Government, the new director of Monte Amiata, Ric-
cardo Salvadori, appointed by the new owners, the 
Banca Commerciale, went to Madrid with a proposal 
to share out the market (estimated at some 100,000 
flasks per year) at a ratio of 60,000 flasks for Italy 
and 40,000 for Spain. There was to be a single sales 
office at a time of extreme weakness in the Almaden 
production. Once again, no agreement was forth-
coming. So Almaden continued with its system of 
sales until 1925, when it decided to sell almost its 
entire production by open auction11. This was not 
attended by the usual intermediaries like the Roths-
childs or Pickering, although the Sociedad Española 
del Mercurio, created for the purpose by the Banco 
Español de Crédito and comprising Lazard Brothers 
9  During spring 1919 there were many high level 
meetings in Madrid to see if an agreement about the market 
could be reached, but now it was the Italians who would not 
go ahead with the Spanish proposals. Zarraluqui (1934), p. 
748-749.
10 Report of the meeting of 19-4-1920 and Letter from the 
Rothschilds to Alfredo Bauer (Madrid), dated 15-7-1921.Roths-
child Archives, London (hereinafter RAL), XI-111-151. 
11 Almaden had taken the decision in 1922 to sell 
through resellers, who were paid bonuses on the basis of 
sales increase and who had freedom to set prices. The system 
slowly fell apart since many of these brokers brought down 
their prices in order to sell more, and in doing so reduced the 
profits from sales tremendously. ME, Grupo Español, Vol.6 , 
session 30-8-1941.
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and other French banks were present12. The agree-
ments with the Sociedad Española del Mercurio, 
which purchased 45,000 and 50,000 flasks at 14 and 
17 pounds, respectively, in 1926 and 1927, proved 
highly profitable for the Spanish Treasury, which 
collected 44,737,992.56 pesetas. ($7,634,469.72 or 
£1,569,203.53) in those two years from these and 
other, lesser, sales13; which was the highest profit 
ever obtained to  date for the Almaden, more even 
than under the Rothschilds.
3.-A bad start, 1928-1932
The Italians did not give up in their attempts to 
convince Spain of the need for an agreement14, espe-
cially when there was spectacular increase in the Al-
maden production, which rose from 26,220 to 75,000 
flasks between 1921 and 1927, with sales jumping 
from 19,507 in 1921to 61,885 flasks in 192615.
Apparently Almaden was now in a better ne-
gotiating position for any agreement, while its seams 
continued to be the richest in the world at the time, 
12  García Ruiz, J. L. (2002). The Banca Comerciale 
Italiana, the main shareholder in Monte Amiata, would take a 
share, Segreto (1991), p. 86.
13  Zarraluqui (1932), p. 741  and 798
14  There were even attempts by third parties to foster 
an agreement between Spain and Italy. One example was the 
Hamburg house of Hugo Falck & Co, which on July 1, 1926 
consulted the Rothschilds, through Kuhn, Loeb & Co, of New 
York, about setting up a syndicate to negotiate an agreement 
with the two governments. The London Rothschilds replied 
to Kuhn, Loeb & Co. on September 21, informing them along 
the lines of the following: interest in combining Spanish and 
Italian interests is obvious, yet very difficult in practice as both 
countries are highly jealous of each other; although the plan 
has been put forward again and again, nothing has ever come 
of it. There have been talks about this matter in Spain recently, 
and a proposal exists to set up a Spanish company to rent the 
Almaden mines. Should it go ahead it will have to include the 
Italians. For the moment, we do not believe that the proposal 
in this letter can prosper. We have been constantly informed 
of the matter and we were the sole Spanish Government 
sales agent for many years. Our friends in Spain have already 
enquired as to whether we would participate in this Spanish 
company were it to be set up. In such a case, you will under-
stand that we are averse to taking any other initiative.RAL 
XI-111-247.
15 Zarraluqui (1932), p. 800. According to some sources 
in 1926 Spanish mines sold only 46,000 flasks.
with a richness of 6-8%, and a wealth of reserves16. 
Furthermore, the first effects of technological re-
forms undertaken in the 1920s meant its operating 
costs (3 pounds and 10 shillings the flask) were much 
lower than those of other mercury mines in the world, 
including the Italian ones, which were more disperse 
with a grade ore of around 2% (between one fourth 
and one tenth of the Spanish one, depending on the 
years), which meant that the cost was between 7 and 
10 pounds the flask.17
However, the possibility that agreement with 
the Italian mines could increase profits even more at 
a time when market prices in London stood around 
£21-22 in 1927-28 and in New York at between 117 
and 123$ the flask of mercury; and the perspectives 
were for these prices to hold over the medium term. 
So the Spanish Government decided to go ahead, 
given the increasing margins being obtained with its 
mercury by the Sociedad Española del Mercurio and 
other brokers. The market evaluation of the Spanish 
government was not confirmed by the real trends. 
After 1925 both Italian producer and Almadén sold 
far fewer flasks, because the biggest mercury con-
sumers were bidding on the price reduction, on the 
basis of rumors spread by speculators. Despite the 
critical situation, their production strategy was dif-
ferent. While Monte Amiata decide to reduce pro-
duction, the Spanish mines continued to increase it. 
The more rational and entrepreneurial ap-
proach to the situation of international market shown 
16  A report stated that in 1926 the mineral to be ex-
tracted without any big effort was for 600,000 flask, while 
the mines could work for another couple of centuries (Cfr. 
Archivio centrale dello Stato, ASIRI, serie Rossa,  b. 520, 
Mercurio Europeo, Considerazioni sul’esercizio 1930).
17  This was possible in any case thanks to very low 
wages, which compensated inefficiencies, and a very tradi-
tional organization of labor. The North American seams were 
way behind (never exceeding 0.37%) According to experts, 
these mines were always considered marginal from the eco-
nomic point of view, whose activity could be developed only 
when international prices were extremely high, to compensate 
the structural inefficiencies of these mines, as was the case 
during the wars or during particular periods, as in the 1920’s, 
when demand and/or speculative behavior by big metal traders 
pushed up the pricesReport on the Mercury situation of 10-12-
1929 from A. Pickering to the Rothschilds, RAL XI-111-427 
and United States Tariff Commission (Mercury). Washington, 
1944, p. 3-4. 
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by the Italian producers gained support during the 
negotiations that started in early 1928 in Madrid. The 
stocks in Almadén reached 50,000 flasks, and among 
the Italian producers  24,800 (14,000 at the Monte 
Amiata, 7,000 in Idria and 3,800 at the Stabilimento 
Minerario del Siele, the second biggest producer in 
the Monte Amiata area). The highly probable sale 
of the stocks by the speculators, would have led to 
a new increase in sales by the producers, but this 
new situation would have been used to rationalize 
the market through an agreement between the main 
producers to harmonize production and keep prices 
under control18
The provisional was agreement signed in 
Madrid on April 28, 1928 between the chairman of 
the Minas de Almaden, Admiral Antonio del Castillo 
and the CEO of Monte Amiata, Riccardo Salvadori, 
who was acting also on behalf of the Siele company 
and Idria mines, owned by the Italian state. The su-
pervision of the business negotiations by the Span-
ish Treasury minister, Calvo Sotelo, and the Italian 
ambassador in Spain, gave the agreement stronger 
importance in all aspects.
For the agreement, which was valid only for 
the mineral and the liquid mercury and only for the 
flasks sold on the international market ( the domes-
tic markets of both groups were excluded from the 
entente) a single body was set up for the sales of the 
mercury produced by the associated mines. It was 
to establish both the level of production and sell the 
production at a ratio of 55% for Spain and 45% for 
Italy19 during the first three years of the agreement. 
In the following three years, and for a further four 
if the agreement was extended, the figure was to be 
40% for Italy and 60% for Spain. In short, the sales 
cartel would last six years, with a four-year exten-
sion unless one of its members advised of its with-
drawal with one year’s notice. The sales price would 
be determined by the committee, which could alter 
it as it saw fit on the basis of market circumstances 
or for other justified reasons. The price was always 
18 Minutes of the Monte Amiata Board of Director, 
14.1.1928; 3.2.1928.
19  The Italian share was distributed as follows: Monte 
Amiata, 51.03%, Idria, 25.67% and Siele 23.3%.
to be fixed at the port of exit of at the border of the 
countries, since shipping costs from the mines to the 
point of export were to be borne exclusively by each 
producer20. 
The final agreement was ratified in Madrid 
on September 9, 1928, and the only modifications of 
importance were the inclusion in the cartel of the So-
cietà Mercurifera Italiana, also represented by Ric-
cardo Salvadori, and the decision to call the cartel 
Mercurio Europeo (hereinafter ME). The cartel was 
to commence on October 1, 1928 and, for greater ef-
fectiveness, both groups were bound not to perform 
any sales operations with delivery dates after that 
date. There were a few other minor issues, such as 
the right of each group to change its ports of depar-
ture, after advising thereof, and a final clause, num-
ber 17, affirming that “the contract shall be deemed 
terminated at any moment in which either Italy or 
Spain becomes involved in a war, other than one re-
lating to their colonies.”, although, as we shall see, 
this clause was never used to practical effect21.
The consumption in the mercury market 
was stable since many years, despite some evident 
irregular movements in any single year, around 
100-110,000 flasks per year. In all industrial sec-
tors where the metal was used, its presence was so 
low that its price cold not really influence the final 
20  The office of the cartel was to be situated in a neutral 
country, Switzerland,  in  Lausanne. It would be financed 
by 1% of the sales. The office was to be administered by the 
Management Committee, which would comprise a maximum 
of ten members, five from each group. The committee would 
have a chairman and vice-chairman, who would serve for 
one year and would rotate on a yearly basis between the two 
groups. In order to avoid any transgressions of these com-
mitments, each group was to declare the points of export for 
the mercury production, which in Spain would be the ports of 
Seville and Alicante and for Italy those of Genoa, Livorno and 
Trieste, although, giving due advice, changes could be made 
during the course of the agreement. On a quarterly basis, each 
group was to send to the Lausanne office a customs certificate 
detailing the mercury exports made. Non fulfillment of the 
agreement would be sanctioned by a fine equivalent to ten 
times the sale value of each flask at the time of infraction, with 
the amount to be paid into the account of the other party
21 Almaden Foundation Archives (hereinafter AFA) 
R-15/513, ME Managing Committee minutes, Volume 1, Ses-
sion 29-9-1928.
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price of the product it was called to co-produce. The 
two member groups of the cartel adopted the same 
strategy in the months before the enforcement of the 
new regulatory institution: they preferred to elimi-
nate all the stocks, selling all the flasks they had in 
their stocks to speculators, and particularly to Lazard 
Bros., which in the two months before October 1° 
1928 bought more than 88,000 flasks. In total, big 
sellers and speculators accounted for at least 100,000 
flasks, i.e. the equivalent of one year consumption. 
In fact Spanish and Italian members of ME wanted 
to start the activity of the cartel without any flasks 
in their deposits because they were sought to take 
full advantage of the new situation. The general ef-
fect of that decision was mixed. On the one hand the 
members of the cartel offered the big speculators 
the weapon to undermine the effectiveness of their 
agreement, because with such an amount of flasks at 
its disposal it would have been difficult to sell any 
other flask through ME for about one year. On the 
other hand Lazard and other big sellers poisoned the 
information, amplifying the danger of an increase 
of prices because of the existence of the production 
cartel, so inducing big consumers to bring forward 
their purchases22. But de facto the cartel was to start 
its activities by reinforcing its main aim, which was 
to eliminate overproduction, the only way to avoid a 
crisis which could be lethal for any of its members.
The first Board Meeting of the Mercurio Eu-
ropeo Managing Committee, that was  held on Sep-
tember 26, 192823, at the offices of the Bank of Spain 
in Paris, was faced with this very difficult situation24.
22 Minutes of the Monte Amiata Board of Director, 
meeting of 6.11.1928.
23  Ibid. Committe meetings were held every three 
months at a different office and lasted four or five days. There 
were many periods when the meetings alternated between the 
offices of Almaden in Madrid and those of Amiata in Rome, 
although many were also held in Paris before 1936 at the of-
fices of the Banque Française et Italienne pour L’Amerique 
du Sud and Roura & Forgas, both in Paris. During the Second 
World War they were held in Switzerland.
24  On the part of the Spanish group it was attended 
by Antonio del Castillo Romero, Chairman of the Board of 
Directors of the Minas de Almaden y Arrayanes; Juan Rossell 
y Magaz; Julio Zarraluqui y Martínez, head of administra-
tion at Almaden; and Felipe Gómez-Acebo y Echevarría and 
Jesús Marañón Zorrilla. The Italian delegation included Louis 
Cordella, representative of the Italian Ministry for National 
Economy; Emanuele Ricci, for the the Idria mines; Isaac Ros-
 The difficult situation did not leave many al-
ternatives to ME. It could fight against the specula-
tors, who were selling their flasks at 5% less than 
ME, but the situation might last for at least 8-9 
months (the time necessary for speculators to sell all 
their flasks), with the risk of worsening even more 
the economic and social situation in both Italy and 
Spain; or to find a compromise, in order to minimize 
the sacrifices, which was Salvadori’s initial recom-
mendation. In conclusion, he proposed a price per 
flask of 21.15 pounds sterling, with the idea of avoid-
ing a fight against the speculators, while consider-
ing, too, that mercury had been selling in London at 
over £22 for some months. Nevertheless, he quali-
fied this by stating that it was necessary to establish 
special criteria for the USA given the possibility for 
important exports there in the future because of the 
development of a mercury steam boiler by General 
Electric. The committee fully backed his arguments, 
insisting on the importance of promoting the image 
that the cartel had not been set up to increase sales 
prices but to regulate the market and avoid competi-
tion between mines and the negative effects of spec-
ulation25.
 The partners set to immediately. The Spanish 
group sent letters to its main customers and published 
selli-Tedesco, CEO of the Stabilimento Minerario del Siele; 
Gino Luzzatti, one of the directors of Monte Amiata, and the 
CEO of the same company, Riccardo Salvadori, who served 
as the chairman in the early years, in rotation with the head of 
Almaden at the time From the outset, the Italians asked for the 
first chairmanship, and it was decided that the chairman would 
be Salvadori, “for his proven efficiency of in managing current 
issues”. The vice-chairmanship went to del Castillo and at the 
same time an executive committee was approved consisting of 
four members: del Castillo, Zarraluqui, Salvadori and Ricci. 
There were practically no changes to these initial ten members 
during the years the years the cartel lasted, with the excep-
tions of the directors of Almaden, who succeeded each other 
in the following order: Castilla (1928-1930), José de Lara 
(1930-1931), Alfredo de Zabala (1931), Enrique de Francisco 
(1932-1933), Enrique Conde (1934-1936), Mariano Arenas 
(1936), Mariano Ginovéz (1936) Marino Saiz (1936-1939?), 
JesúsMarañón (1939-1944) and Manuel Ocharán (1945-1961). 
Zarraluqui retired in 1931 and was replaced by the engineer 
Machimbarrena, ME president in 1933. On the Italian side 
Fagiuoli replaced Salvadori in 1933, and he was replaced in 
1943 by Giovanni Malvezzi, until the end the cartel. Cordella, 
Montagna and Rossel were the secretaries of the board.
25 ME Managing Committee minutes, Volume 1, Ses-
sion 29.9.1928.
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an announcement in the specialist media to the effect 
that any future purchase was to be made through the 
ME office in Lausanne. This did not, however, pre-
vent the members of the new cartel receiving indi-
vidual requests from the brokers (or “speculators”, 
according to the members of the cartel) for mercu-
ry26. 
The authoritative tone of the ME directors 
was upheld during the early months of the cartel, 
despite the plummeting sales - Octubre1928, 2,384 
flasks; November, 1,269 and just 226 in December. 
Even so, Salvadori’s report on the first three months 
of the cartel set off no alarm bells. Indeed, he con-
firmed that all European production was in the hands 
of ME bar the tiny production of a few residual 
mines, in Italy, which came to some 2,000 flasks a 
year. Even the low (but growing) level of the Italian 
ousiders’ production was a danger for Monte Amiata, 
because the Spanish partner could accuse the Italians 
of harming relations with the Almaden, so putting at 
risk the general agreement27. In short, in the follow-
ing years no nation was going to suppose a threat 
competition-wise in Europe, and ME would contin-
ue to supply 50% of the world’s needs. There is no 
question of the leading role of ME in the markets28.
North American production grew because the price 
was high, but it could not meet internal consump-
tion demands, so the country continued to draw on 
European imports29. The committee assumed that in 
26  The Spanish ME Committee noted in its meeting 
of October 29, 1928 of a request for a price for 10,000 flasks 
from the Canthal house, from its office in Cartagena. The com-
mittee wrote back to reject the operation.AFA, R-15/522, ME 
Spanish Group, Volume 1.
27  In 1928 all Italian producers sold 61,200 flasks, 1929 
21,800, and in 1930 23,000, but the companies outside the 
consortium sold in the same year 1,000, 1,200 and 3,500 flasks 
(Cfr. ASIRI, serie rossa, allegato 2)
28 AFA, R-15/513, ME Managing Committee minutes, 
Volume 1, Session 5-febr-1929.The inexistence of the mine 
that Pickering had been making believe he controlled for years 
with an apparent production of 50,000 flasks is confirmed. 
There is an insistence that the mercury substitutes on the 
market (which appear because of the high prices) do not yet 
suppose a threat.
29  From the tariff of 1920 (ratified in 1930) mercury 
imported into the USA paid a duty of 25 cents on the pound 
which translated into an overpricing of 19 dollars per flask, 
which the European mercury had to contend with to compete 
with the North American mercury. Tariff Commission (1944), 
those months it would have to pay for the excess pro-
duction of the two previous years. This excess (some 
50,000 flasks, at a sales price of around 19 pounds) 
was in the hands of British and German speculators, 
sustained by Lazard Brothers (“très connu comme un 
speculateur hazardeux”). If normality was to return, 
this stock had to disappear30. 
Salvadori put forward two options: to negoti-
ate with Lazard Brothers31 or to lower prices to 19 
pounds or less over a long period, although he again 
showed himself in favor of maintaining the approved 
price, as dropping the price to 19 pounds would al-
low speculators to buy up stock and prolong their 
maneuverings. He reckoned that the pressure from 
the speculators would last through till end of March 
or beginning of April. Information at disposal said 
that speculators were almost finishing their stocks 
a25,000 flasks, even though only 4,000 were as-
sured32.
 Once again, however, the chairman’s expec-
tations were over optimistic. Sales until May con-
tinued very low and the cartel had sold just 1/5 of 
what it had forecast. Meanwhile, stocks continued 
to accumulate in the associated mines (see table 1), 
until they stood at 63,420, including three months of 
reserve production. As a consequence, the total mar-
ket stock would have been around 83,000 flasks, and 
with a growth rate that would take it to 100,000 by 
the end of the year. The long-expected, but uncon-
firmed, extraordinary purchase for the General Elec-
tric experimental steam boilers was not forthcoming. 
Without that order, the sales for the year would bare-
p. 12. Although the growth was a future threat, the American 
experts  consulted did not foresee large growth. Of more con-
cern were the doubts of General Electric and Sun Oil Co. of 
Philadelphia about going ahead with its steam boilersince the 
high prices made it unviable.
30 AFA, R-15/513, ME Managing Committee minutes, 
Volume 1, Session 5-febr-1929.
31 Actually, to continue negotiations, since in the previ-
ous months there had been a failed proposal from ME to push 
out the stocks. The German speculators had threatened to drop 
the price to £18-£19 if there was no agreement.
32  A reduction on exceptional sales to well known 
industrial businesses was not discarded. Specifically, there was 
a proposal for a reduction of 5 shillings to some customers, on 
condition that they did not make this public.
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ly top 20.000 flasks.
In the end, faced with the possibility that it 
all been a case of sales mismanagement by the Laus-
anne office, ME was forced to reconvert its main pur-
chasers in each country into commission agents, an 
option that obviously appealed to the latter greatly. 
The first four to take up the new role that summer of 
1929 were Mitsubishi, Leghorn Trading Co., Roura 
& Forgas and Hirsch & Sohn. From these the list 
grew until it covered almost all the potential markets.
 The representatives progressively signed 
individual contracts of one year duration (January 
to December).All were under the same conditions 
except that of the English representative (Roura 
& Forges) who acted as a seller for ME, but sold 
independently, while the others were brokers for the 
public. In any case, all the representatives could not 
sell mercury other than that of ME and at the price 
stipulated by ME33. At the same time, the ME was 
entitled to sell directly anywhere in the world but 
at the same price as its representatives. If for any 
reason the cartel were to put up its prices, it would 
compensate its representatives through the differ-
ence. The general sales commission was ½% for all 
on the price, in the case of sales managed by ME, 
with the exception of the USA, where there was no 
commission, and the Belgians and the Germans, 
who were to receive 1%.When sales were managed 
by the representatives the figure rose to 1%, except 
for Japan and Belgium, where it was to be 1.25% 
and 2% respectively. There were also minimum 
annual targets to be met. The German representa-
33  Representatives could buy for their stock and sell 
later (with a limit of 1,000 flasks in the USA).
tives were committed to selling 6,200 flasks, plus 
the sales of Fikesstcher; in England it was 6,000; 
India750; Belgium 150. The others, however, did 
not have an explicit commitment. In any case, the 
represents imposed on their customers the condition 
that they would not re-sell the mercury or, at least, 
not re-export it34.As a further strategy to encourage 
sales, ME decided to offer its buyers a 1% discount 
when sales exceeded 500 flasks; 1,5% when the fig-
ure topped 750 flasks and un 2% if they bought over 
1,000flasks35.In  early 1930 they also launched a 
special prize (value 500,000 lira) for the researcher 
who suggested ways to increase the consumption of 
mercury on a regular bases36
The situation did not improve and with the 
exception of a few months between summer 1929 
and spring 1930, sales remained relatively very low 
(see graph 2)37. In the first 27 months of ME’s life 
34  Again the exception considered is the sales contracts 
for the steam boilers and for other new applications of mer-
cury.AFA, R-15/513, ME Managing Committee minutes, Vol. 
1, October 7, 1929 and Vol. 2 (R-15/514), May 12, 1931.
35  AFA, R-15/513, ME Managing Committee minutes, 
Vol. 1, February 20, 1929
36 ACS, ASIRI, Serie Rossa, b. 520, mercurio Europeo, 
Sindacato Italo-Spagnolo “Mercurio Europeo”, note of the Uf-
ficio Studi of the Banca Commerciale Italiana, February 1930.
37  Meanwhile, Pickering informed the Rothschild at the 
end of 1929 about the seriousness of the situation. According 
to his information the official mercury prices of mercury in 
effect (21 pounds, 5 shillings) were pure fiction and should, 
in his opinion, be around 7 pounds. The reasons were clear 
for the broker: there was an unsold stock of 130,000 flasks, 
of which 80,000 were Spanish and 50,000 Italian. Then there 
were a further 15,000 to 20.000 flasks in the hands of inter-
mediaries. World production was estimated at 150,000 flasks, 
but sales had fallen to just 100,000 flasks. The response of the 
producers was, on top of everything else, contradictory, since 
the California production was being increased, as was that of 
Idria. Therefore, all the mines were increasing their unsold 
Table 1: The stock situation of the ME associated mines in May 1929.
Unsold 3 month reserves Total
Almaden 24,000 11,000 35000
Monte Amiata 9,750 4,455 14.205
Idria 4,750 2,250 700
Siele 4,400 2,025 6,425
Mercurifera 520 270 790
TOTALS 43,420 20,000 63,420
Source: AFA, R-15/513, ME Managing Committee minutes, Volume 1, Sessions 22-26 May 
1929.
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level of sales38. Only the good relations established 
over the years with the Spanish government could 
limit the damages. In fact, the Italians recognized the 
very coherent conduct of their allies, who in 1930 
resisted the calls of Lazard Brother in London, which 
offered  £100,000 million to sustain the exchange 
rate of the Spanish peseta on the international market 
in return for having the entire Almaden production at 
its disposal39. But the reciprocal trust of the cartel’s 
members was not enough. Their mines produced dur-
38 ACS, ASIRI, SerieRossa, b. 520, MercurioEuropeo, 
Report on year 1930.
39 Ibid, Salvadori to J. Toeplitz, CEO of BancaCommer-
ciale, 28.6.1930.
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(October 1920-december 1930) world consumption 
was 267,000 flasks, i.e. something less than 110,500 
per year, only a small proportion inferior to the nor-
mal level. The chairman of ME, Salvadori, was also 
perfectly aware that it was impossible to sell the 
same production twice. With the decision taken by 
all the producers before the beginning of ME’s ac-
tivities and with a relatively stable world consump-
tion, it made no sense to be surprised about the low 
stocks. In this situation, Almaden should have been the most 
favored of the mines with its production cost of just 3 pounds 
10 shillings the flask, as opposed to the 7 to 10 pounds per 
flask of the Italian mines. Report on the state of mercury of 
10-12-1929, RAL XI-111-427.
Table 2: List of Mercurio Europeo representatives/Commisionist, 1931.
Area of Sales Commission Minimum saleguaranted
Société Anonyme 
Française Mithsubishi Japon and China





United States and 
Canada
0 None
Julio Cesar Murgi 
(Buenos Aires)
Argentine
½% sales from ME
1% Own sales
None
Comtoir des Scories et 








France and its 
colonies





India and  Persian 
Gulf harbors






½% sales from ME
1% Own sales
None
Roura & Forgas 
(London)
United Kingdom, its 
dominions and, 
Australia, South 
Africa, New Zealand 
and the Guyana
½% sales from ME
1% Own sales
6,000 flasks




½% sales from ME
1% Own sales
None
Société Anonyme des 
Metaux et Minerais 
(Zurich)
Switzerland
½% sales from ME
1% Own sales
None




1% sales from ME
1% Own sales
6,000 flasks*
Source: AFA, R-15/513, ME Managing Committee minutes, Vol. 1, October 7, 1929 and Vol. 2 
(R-15/514), May 12, 1931.
*plus the sales of Fikesstcher
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ing those years even more than in normal times. But 
these were no longer normal times. In late 1930 the 
ME directors recognized for the first time that it was 
not a problem of stock or speculation, but of a slump 
in industrial demand brought about by a general cri-
sis that was incompatible with prices of the cartel. In 
1929 and in 1930 sales remained below 75,000, 50% 
of the level of 1928 and, even more importantly, 25% 
below the consumption average. In particular, one of 
the largest markets, the American one, was showing 
a spectacular decrease: only 1,200 flasks had been 
sold in the USA, compared to the 11,356 in 1929.
Yet the committee opted to maintain the official price 
at £21.15.0, preferring other more readily available 
solutions such as obliging the representatives to sell 
a guaranteed minimum, preventing competition from 
Spanish and Italian producers or providing annual 
contracts to its customers40.
That June ME managed to exceed for the sec-
ond time its desired quota of 7,500 flasks per month, 
although the figure fell again in the following months. 
The cartel closed its third year with losses, never hav-
ing reached the 80,000 flasks per year it had envis-
aged (3,879 flasks in the last quarter of 1928; 40,138 
in 1929; 33,843 in 1930; and just 24,013 in 1931). 
Financially, 1928-1929, and 1930 were not so bad, 
with figures of $4,089,935.85 and $3,487,214.90, 
and at a price of 21 pounds the flask, when Almaden 
had sold its total production between 1927 and 1928 
at 17 pounds to the Sociedad Española del Mercu-
rio. But 1931 closed with just $1,711,468.55, which 
threatened not just the viability of the Italian mines 
but also that of the Spanish deposits
It was only in May 1931, when the Lausanne 
office was on the verge of collapse, that the Com-
mittee, met with the sales manager of ME, Miner-
bi, who explained the bad sales situation. On being 
asked for a realistic market price, he proposed a 
reduction to at least £17 the flask. The Committee 
enquired how much such a reduction would stimu-
late sales, to which Minerbi replied that he did not 
believe that there would be any significant increase 
40 AFA, R-15/513, ME Managing Committee minutes, 
Vol. 1, October 20, 1930 session; ACS, ASIRI, serierossa, b. 
520.
given the industrial crisis, but that he believed that it 
was fundamental to hinder the efforts of the outsid-
ers. On the basis of these exchanges the ME decided 
on May 12 to reduce the price of the flask of mercury 
to £16.15.0., as of June 1, 193141. It was agreed that 
the office should have elasticity regarding sales, with 
a minimum set at 15 pounds42.
Nevertheless, one of the most worrying ele-
ments was the increase in production in the USA, 
where the high prices were encouraging new mines 
to be opened (from a few tens the end of the 1920’s 
they were almost 50 in early 1931, but went down to 
38 at the end of that year) and a slump in exports, de-
spite significant exports in 1931 (See Graoh 3). The 
same was happening in the other outsider mines in 
Mexico and Italy. The only way to eliminate these 
producers would have been reduce the price to £12, 
which would have provoked too many problems for 
the members of the cartel, because especially for the 
Italian group such a price could not compensate the 
higher costs of productions43.
4.- Change in strategy: single seller (1932-1941).
Given the dramatic situation in the sales and 
the scarce effect the sales contacts with representa-
tives was having, after 18 disappointing months, the 
board of the cartel addressed measures in October 
1931 to stimulate sales, such as giving wider margins 
to some intermediaries, like Roura & Forges, or sig-
nificantly increasing their commissions. It was a very 
delicate moment, when there was a general slump in 
the economy and when the pound had only recently 
abandoned the gold standard (September 21, 1931), 
so sending the pound plummeting by 25%, with the 
result that customers were refusing to trade in that 
currency. ME immediately reacted by shifting to the 
41 Zarraluqui (1934, p. 754) offers an erroneous date in 
his book, delaying the reduction until the autumn.
42  All sales below 15 pounds would require the express 
approval of the chairman and vice-chairman. In the session of 
the same day it was agreed to send an offer to General Electric 
of 7,000 to 10,000 flasks at 13.5 pounds for exclusive use in 
its new boilers. AFA, R-15/514, ME Managing Committee 
minutes, Vol. 2, May 14, 1931. The new price was published 
in the official journals two days prior to its coming into effect.
43  ACS, ASIRI, SerieRossa, b. 520, MercurioEuropeo, 
Report on year 1930; Report on 1931.
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Dollar-Gold as the currency to establish official mer-
cury prices, which nevertheless went down in the 
fourth quarter of 1931 from $80 to $6544.
A new strategy was necessary. The situation 
was but quite complex. Spanish mines remained in 
the best position because of their structure, although 
counterbalanced by the low international business 
image of Almaden and the weakness of the Spanish 
government, considering the general political and 
social situation of the country. Monte Amiata and 
the Italian government had a higher reputation, but 
most of the business related costs were limiting the 
freedom of movements.  On the other hand the main 
leaders of Monte Amiata acknowledged in 1932 that 
they had over evaluated Spain: Spanish bureaucracy 
and government were largely counterbalancing the 
richness of the mines. But fears about real possibili-
ties to compete with Almaden in a free market did 
not completely disappear among the Italians. So two 
weaknesses could become a force, but only with a 
different approach. The need for a new start was clear 
in Salvadori’s words at a meeting of the board of di-
rectors of the Monte Amiata company: ME – he said 
– was a «bureaucratic not a commercial organism». 
It was then necessary to start negotiations with the 
44 AFA, R-15/514, ME Managing Committee minutes, 
Vol. 2, October 1931sessions; ACS, ASIRI, Serie Rossa, b. 
520, Mercurio Europeo, Report on 1931.
«enemy», the main market brokers, the very same 
people whom they had been fighting for the last three 
years (Pickering, Weis, Hirsch, Devusrme, Hond-
heimer and Offembacher). From the Italian point of 
view this was the last resort for the sector: the alter-
native was the dissolution of the cartel with all the 
risks that this solution could hold45. 
On behalf of the group Pickering offered a 
global contract which aimed to sell 25,000 flasks a 
year for three years, at the current market price, with 
a margin of a further 5,000 against possible sales. 
The commission on the sales would be 3%. ME 
would be able to sell however much it wished but 
always at one pound more than the brokers, and not 
less than 50 flasks, which would be deducted from 
the sales agreed (25,000). The price was to be fixed 
by a mixed ME-brokers committee, which would 
perforce bring in lower prices than the current ones. 
The only risk the syndicate committed itself to was 
that if it had not sold the 25,000 flasks by the end of 
the year, it would compensate the losses through its 
commissions46.
45 Minutes of the Monte Amiata Board of Director, 
meeting of 14.12.1931.
46  A further offer by Pickering included a better price 
but also the closing down of the Lausanne ME commercial 
office, and the exclusive selling rights of all the Spanish and 




Graph 2: Mercurio Europeo monthly sales and prices, 1928-1936 
Source: Managing Committee minutes, AFA, R-15/513-518. 
Note: the original source does not provide monthly prices for 1931, so the official price 
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Roura & Forgas, through the Spanish part-
ners, lost no time coming up with a counterproposal. 
The Spanish company offered to sell ME mercury 
everywhere in the world, except in Spain and Italy, 
from January 1, 1932 to September 30, 1934 under 
the following conditions. The firm undertook to sell a 
minimum 30,000 flasks per year (22,500 in 1934, for 
the 9 months that the contract would run that year), 
for the duration of the contract, excluding sales for 
mercury boilers, for a 3% sales commission; Roura 
& Forgas would seek to sell 50% in the first half-
year, although the figure would be 25% in 1932; the 
price was always to be fixed by ME, but after con-
sultation, and the possibility for Roura & Forgas of 
a 10% elasticity to fight the competitors; if it did not 
sell the minimum quota in one year, the firm under-
took to pay ME the unsold part at the mean price of 
the previous quarter the following January. For its 
part, ME could sell as much as it wished itself, but at 
£5 higher than the Roura & Forgas price, and these 
sales would be deduced from the 30.000 quota, with 
Roura & Forgas receiving half their commission47
mittee minutes, Vol. 2 and 3, November 17 and 18, 1931, ses-
sions. As well as the proposal, ME received a visit from Berk, 
another important broker who controlled the sales of the mines 
in Mexico, Chile and Bolivia (about 10,000 flasks). He offered 
ME an alliance on the basis of a price reduction to approxi-
mately £8. 
47  Finally, as guarantee, Roura & Forgas was to deposit 
$150,000 in a leading bank, agreed upon with ME, and would 
allow the cartel to have a delegate in its offices to supervise 
the whole process . AFA, R-15/515, ME Managing Committee 
The ME board immediately took up the of-
fer, so obviating that of the “speculators”, which it 
did not like because there was no bank guarantee at-
tached, because it would mean a loss of price control 
and, in some way, could be seen as giving in to their 
opponents of the last decade. Moreover, the offer 
provided the opportunity to close the costly Laus-
anne office (it was necessary to change the ME rules 
in order to suppress all the clauses on management 
by this office), not to mention the fact that Roura & 
Forga had in place an extensive worldwide distribu-
tion network, which it would extend in the following 
years.48
The choice of Roura & Forgas could not have 
been better under the circumstances as, although 
minutes, Vol. 3, November 20, 1931 Session
48 Roura & Forgas was a long-standing trading house 
that had started in Catalonia, in Begur (Gerona) in 1790. The 
company grew in the mid nineteenth century under Francesc 
Forgas Elias, who also traded in coral. In 1870 he opened an 
office in London with his partner Roura and then set up branch 
offices in Edinburgh, Liverpool, Hamburg, Mainz, Yokohama 
and Australia. The business closed in 1950. Pere Sala (1998), 
p. 117-118. Following the 1937 Paris International Exhibition, 
Almaden Brochure, Roura & Forgas set up its headquarters in 
London and had offices in Liverpool, Edinburgh, New York, 
Melbourne, Kobe, Hamburg, Johannesburg, Paris, Bombay, 
Calcutta, Madras, Ljubljana, Shanghai, Lisbon, Oporto, War-
saw and Bucharest. By 1937 it had mercury stores in London, 
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prices did not improve, sales picked up immediate-
ly. Indeed, not only did the firm cover the minimum 
quota for October 193249, more importantly, it put a 
stop to the growing sales and productions of the out-
siders (see Graph 4), and put the cartel firmly back as 
the world market leader, especially in North Ameri-
ca, Germany, the United Kingdom and its colonies 
and Japan.   
The relation with the London firm was tre-
mendously fluid and efficient. Roura & Forgas sent 
the committee detailed monthly reports on sales and 
the situation of each of the markets, and these served 
as the basis for more coherent price policy given the 
reality of the depressed industry. On various occa-
sions ME went so far as to consider withdrawing its 
London agent. In January, 1933 both parties agreed 
to modify the contract given the results of the pre-
vious year, and the sales commitment was upped to 
50,000 flask at $30; if it sold at up to $32 the mar-
gin was to be kept by Roura  & Forgas, while from 
$32 to $35 it would divided between them and the 
cartel, with the exception again of the steam boilers, 
on which Roura & Forgas were to receive a commis-
sion of 1%. Nevertheless, the market continued to se-
verely punish mercury prices, which fell to below 10 
pounds ($35.06) in July 1932, and slipped on down 
to a minimum 21.8 gold dollars in August 1933. At 
that price, as had been mooted, Monte Amiata had 
to reduce it production and lay off most of its work-
force50. So it was that between the summer of 1933 
and that of 1934, only 1.725 flasks were produced, 
with the corresponding important financial losses. In 
Spain, the Almaden mine contracted a production a 
production of below 20.000 flasks for a full five year 
period. Yet the cartel had saved itself in time.
This apparent honeymoon among the ME 
partners had hidden many more critical elements. 
The American market was still too weak, while the 
instability of the US dollar permitted sometimes 
49  Pickering did not react well to the decision or to how 
the market was going in the hands of Roura&Forgas the fol-
lowing year, and he presented a new offer on October 11, 1932 
to purchase 48,000 flasks at a net price of $32 FOB. It was not 
taken up. ME did, however, use the offer to put the screws on 
Roura & Forgas to improve the conditions of the contract. 
50  The Italian mercury mines went from having 3,207 
workers in 1929 to just 865 in 1934. Segreto (1990), p. 226.
the very aggressive Mexican producers to compete 
with the ME deliveries. On the other hand the US 
mercury companies met in a new organization, the 
National Quicksilver Producers Association, which 
informally admitted the possibility of an agreement 
with ME based on the fixation of a minimum price 
for the flasks. But they also added that without such 
an agreement they were ready to ask the Roosevelt 
administration for strong protection against foreign 
mercury. This proposal was not supported by the rep-
resentative of Almaden, which correctly reckoned 
that any price agreement with the American mines 
would have opened the door to an even more aggres-
sive policy by the Mexican producers51.
Meanwhile in early 1933 the ownership 
structure of Monte Amiata changed significantly. 
The consequences of the 1929 crisis was a deep re-
form of the banking system, the separation between 
short and long term credit, and, even more important, 
the setting up of a new State holding company, In-
stituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale, which took 
over all the shareholdings previously in the hand of 
the main Italian banks. So Iri became the new main 
shareholder of Monte Amiata. A new chairman was 
elected, Vincenzo Fagiuoli, a talented expert in an-
cient Greek and Latin before becoming the secretary 
of the Finance minister Alberto De Stafani in the first 
Musslini government, and with some recent success-
ful experiences as a manager of two State controlled 
companies, the Società finanziaria per l’industria e il 
commercio and the Società egiziana fosfati.
The new chairman was no less strong in de-
fending Italian interests against, first of all, the other 
member of the cartel, but had a clearer vision of the 
real balance of power between the two groups. In 
1933 the Spanish group threatened to decrease the 
flask price to destroy outsiders, but also to attack the 
Italian partners. In fact Almaden’s strategic aim was 
to maintain the agreement but to renegotiate the quo-
ta towards a 65-35 proportion from a 60-40 which 
had been the proportion between the two groups 
since 1931. The new Spanish republican government 
51  ACS, ASIRI, b. 520, Annexe au procès verbale de 
la réunion du MercurioEuropeo tenue à paris les 9-14 octobre 
1933.
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was quite negative about the renewal of the cartel. 
Political and ideological reasons suggested the with-
drawal of Almaden, while the general director of the 
mines, despite his personal sympathies for Italy and 
its regime, was supporting the idea of a new agree-
ment although on different basis. 
According to the Italian ambassador in Spain, 
Almaden had a practical and a technical interest for 
keeping the agreement, mainly due to the « still 
not perfect and efficient preparation for a competi-
tive regime with Italy both from the metal extrac-
tion and the commercial points of view». But he also 
criticized the former Monte Amiata CEO, Salvadori, 
for being too optimistic in the negotiations with the 
Spanish partners, starting talks with the tactic of de-
nouncing the agreement, and the strategy of offering 
a small piece of the cake to the Spanish (including 
some Italian outsiders in the cartel) to keep the pro-
duction proportions between the two groups52. 
52 Ibid, Italian ambassador Guariglia to Italian Foreign 
ministry, 26.8.1033.
Fagiuoli was a better negotiator than Salva-
dori, because he admitted that the modernization and 
the technical capabilities of the Spanish mines left 
the Italians little to hope for. «The Spanish will be 
able to deliver alone the mercury to all the market, 
and if we Italians remain, for national prestige, on the 
market and keep on selling, we should do in loss, and 
in this case the losses will be only for the State».53
This more realistic position facilitated the 
new rounds of negotiations between the two groups. 
The cartel partners renewed the agreement of June 7, 
1934 (through to the end of 1936), and this  included 
a series of conditions that Spain saw as being benefi-
cial: the quotas of each country were to incorporate 
all the mines, including the outsiders, from the mo-
ment the Italian State had taken over the administra-
tion of the whole production54. 
53 Ibid, Fagiuoli to the Italian Ministry of Corporations, 
7.1.1933.
54  This condition affected Italy more, where the Siam 
and Argus mines accumulated productions of over 4,000 





Graph 4: Distribution of sales in the world mercury market. 1926-1935. 
 
Source: From 1927 to 1931, report from Roura & Forges, Mercurio Europeo, Comité 
Directive minutes, Vol., since 1932, except 1928, calculated from ME Sales 
(see Graph 2) and Zarraluqui (1934), p. 799. Before 1928, ME sales ME 
means the sales of the cartel member mines.  
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When they signed the agreement a new con-
tract with Roura y Forgas was active since the end 
of 1933. At the end of that year, after refusing a 
proposal by Pickering to replace Roura as an exclu-
sive agent with the promise to sell flasks also in the 
very promising Japanese market, a new contract was 
signed with Roura y Forgas valid till January 1936. 
The contract was then reviewed again in 193455, and 
now granted Roura & Forgas a leeway of 15% on 
the price fixed by ME and keeping a minimum of 
115,000 flasks for the following 23 months. This fig-
ure was increasingly further from that of the cartel’s 
final sales, which progressed amazingly from 61,852 
55 AFA, R-15/516, ME Managing Committee minu-
tes, Vol. 4, January 15, 1934; ACS, ASIRI, Serie rossa, b. 
520, “Mercurio Europeo, Rapporto sulle sedute del Comitato 
direttivo di “Mercurio Europeo”, tenute a Parigi dal 10 al 15 
dicembre 1934”.
flasks in 1933 to 62,155 in 1934 and 92,679 in 1935, 
which was when the Almaden mine had completely 
exhausted its stock and began work to extend the 
mine.
The evolution of the cartel caused great sat-
isfaction among the partners in the summer of 1936, 
with the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. By then 
the recovery of the Almaden productions was a fact, 
with 43,000 flasks being produced and sales continu-
ing the successful trend of the previous year (until 





UK Germany Japan and China France 
British 
dominions Switzerland Belgium Others 
Total 
Sales 
1929 11,357 7,266 5,420 6,800 800 249 707  3,812 36,411 
1930 2,350 11,486 6,692 5,025 4,071 1,240 1,204 825 952 33,845 
1931 150 7,210 4,265 5,450 2,852 952 227 375 782 22,263 
1932 7,820 13,507 8,388 13,149 1,947 3,468 319 584 1,154 50,336 
1933 20,382 14,882 13,467 9,568 2,114 2,198 478 552 2,735 66,376 
1934 7,560 14,552 16,933 11,659 1,668 3,888 214 255 4,381 61,110 
 
Table 3: ME mercury purchasers by countries, 1929-1934.
Source: AFA, R-15/516, ME Managing Committee minutes, Volume 4, p 66-67.
 Spanish Group Italian Group 
Up to 60,000 flasks 60% 40%* 
From 60,001 to 70,000 61% 39% 
From 70,001 to 80,000 62% 38% 
From 80,001 to 100,000 65% 35% 
Over100,0000 66% 34% 
 
Table 4: Quotas in the Mercurio Europeo 1934 agreement .
Source:AFA, R-15/516, ME Managing Committee minutes, Volume 4, Sessions of October 9 and 11, 1934 
* the Italian quota was shared out at this level as follows: Monte Amiata, 16.205%; Idria, 8.400%; Siele, 7.795%; 
dissident Italian mines, 7.6%. The quota would be proportionally reduced as higher sales levels were reached. 
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The Almaden mine was in the hands of the Spanish 
Republican Government for nearly the e duration of 
the war, and it took great care to look after one of its 
safest financing assets. Relations with Italy became 
complicated, with the fascist Italian Government 
giving out-and-out support General Franco, and even 
sending troops to support him in Spain, while also 
keeping the contacts with the Spanish Republican 
government. 
In December 1936 Italian representative 
signed a provisional agreement with General Franco 
(which gave the Italians again a 45% quota plus the 
possibility of selling out of the cartel), to be valid 
for one year, but only starting from when nationalist 
troops occupied Almaden. This was not the case till 
the end of the Civil war. To avoid any suspicious and 
to limit any attempt by the Republican government 
to denounce the cartel, Italians agreed with Spanish 
to continue the contract with Roura & Forgas.
The Spanish Government decided to con-
tinue its operations with Roura & Forgas under the 
same conditions as the cartel, as, paradoxically, did 
the Italian Government. On this occasion it delegated 
sales to a middle company named Amalgamated Mer-
chants Ltd., which everybody assumed belonged to 
Roura & Forgas, a belief that was confirmed later by 
the cartel. The situation was fully used by the Italian 
group to increase its position even beyond the quota 
established in the agreement. Only in the first nine 
months of 1937 total ME sold were 61,021 flasks: 
the proportion established by the cartel would give 
33,562 flasks to the Spanish and 27,459 to the Ital-
ian producers; the reality was very different, with the 
Spanish selling only 22,497 and the Italian 38,614 
flasks56. The Italian government was also consider-
ing asking Franco, once he had occupied Almaden, 
to leave them the total control of the Spanish mines’ 
commercial activities, as a compensation for its fi-
nancial support to the military coup57. The unbal-
anced situation continued in 1938, when the Italians 
sold 22,000 flasks at $66, while Almaden sold only 
10,000, and at just $52. The Italian group secretly 
worked also to avoid the delivery of empty flasks 
to Almaden, where the production went on despite 
many difficulties58
56 Archives Finmeccanica, Monte Amiata minutes of 
the BoD, 22.9.1937.
57 With an international market price of $62-67, the 
project was to give the Spanish $8/10 per flasks and keep the 
balance for the Italian Finance ministry. An prudent evaluation 
spoke about the equivalent of 40 million Lira as a benefit for 





Graph 5: Sales of Mercurio Europeo, 1928-1945. 
 
Source: ME Managing Committee minutes and Spanish Group Minutes, AFA, 
R-15/513-529. 
 
19ces papers - open forum # 15, 2013
5.- The great war business (1939-1945). 
Almaden fell into nationalist hands on March 
27, 1939, just a few days before the end of the Span-
ish Civil War.
The ME agreement was renewed (July 4, 
1939) through to April 1940, with revised quotas, 
exactly those requested by the Italian during the 
first secret negotiations with Franco in 1936 (55% 
Spain and 45% Italy)59. The outsider mines were not 
included, which was a sign of the weakness of the 
Spanish group in the face of their partners, who had 
been strengthened by circumstances. 
In spite of renewing the contract in January 
1939, the Spanish Government decided to break with 
Roura & Forgas on account of the support it had of-
fered the republican government during the war. It 
therefore called a tender in autumn 1939. However, it 
was not awarded since none of the bidders were con-
sidered to be sufficiently knowledgeable about the 
business, nor could they provide sufficient financial 
guarantees. The proposals of Pickering and Roura & 
Forgas, who made an offer through the banker Juan 
March, had been discarded beforehand.
The outbreak of World War II - which theo-
retically implied an automatic dissolution of the car-
tel, but the Spanish never denounced it - supposed a 
spectacular increase in sales and prices. Prices went 
in the last weeks of September 1939 from 80 to over 
100 dollars the flask, with two immediate agreements 
with the British and French Governments to provide 
them with 10,000 and 5,000 flasks60. This sudden de-
mand stimulated the cartel into putting up its mini-
mum prices to 120 and 125 dollars for Europe and 
Asia at the end of November61, and then put them up 
another 20 dollars the following month and in just 
a few months to an official $250, a price that was 
maintained for the duration of the war (see Graph 7).
59 Ibid, 18.7.1940; AFA, R-15/526, ME Spanish group 
Minutes, Vol. 5, sessions of May8, 1939; 
60 AFA, R-15/526, ME Spanish group Minutes, Vol. 5, 
sessions of November 5 and 25, 1939.
Following the failure of the sales auction, the 
Spanish Treasury Minister (José Larraz) was deter-
mined in early 1940 to regain the direct management 
of sales through two independent offices, one in Ma-
drid and the other in Rome, even though the Almaden 
directors and the Italian partners advised otherwise62. 
The experiment was not a happy one; the offices did 
not work in coordination and often competed against 
each other. The upshot was that by the end of the year 
Italy had far exceeded its quota over Spain, funda-
mentally on account of its intense sales to Germany 
(59,581 versus 38,618), that Italian asked to consider 
out the 55-45 quota agreement as an element of the 
general agreements between the two governments 
for the huge Spanish debt with Italy, 6 billion Lira63. 
By then, however, the Spanish, Italian and 
German Governments had decided that the Frankfurt 
based Metallgesellschaft would handle the cartel’s 
sales, as indicated by the Reichstelle fuer Metalla, 
the German Government body in charge of control-
ling mercury consumption in Germany and all the 
territories under the Third Reich. The agreement 
took effect in the summer of 1941, although it was 
not signed until January64, which was a relief for 
the Spanish because it gave them the hope of finally 
compensating for the sales between the two groups 
(some 25,000 flasks to date).
The contract with the Metallgesellshaft65 
shared many similarities with that signed earlier with 
Roura & Forgas. As of January 1, the German com-
pany was to sell in Germany and in all the countries 
under the military control of its army at the time 
(Holland, Belgium, occupied France, Poland, Serbia, 
Czechoslovakia, Denmark and Norway) the entire 
62 All that the Spanish consortium obtained from its 
minister was that its sales in the USA were to be handled by 
the Swiss company, Nussbaumer. 
63 Archives Finmeccanica, Monte Amiata minutes of 
the BoD, 13.3.1940.
64 AFA, R-15/527, ME Spanish group Minutes, Vol. 6, 
sessions of August 30, 1941 and January 22, 1942.
65 AFA, R-15/518, ME Managing Committee minutes, 
Volume 6, sessions of December 14 to 19, 1941 (meetings in 
Geneva, Zurich, Basel and Frankfurt).These meetings were 
attended by Marañón, Rossell and Montagna, in representation 
of ME. After the signing of the agreement, the ME meetings 
were held in Berlin.
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ME production at the price stipulated by ME66, at a 
commission of just one ¼% FOB on the sales for 
consumption and, in the case that ME was selling 
in those territories, it would be just half that figure; 
the Metallgesellshaft even went so far as to deposit a 
guarantee of 1,000,000 marks at the Frankfurt Deust-
che Bank and also undertook, as mentioned, to re-
spect the internal quotas of the cartel67.
Thereafter, sales were concentrated more 
and more in Germany (see table468). Meanwhile, 
the agent for North America, Nussbaumer, informed 
that the American Government was not closed to a 
possible purchase of 50,000 to 100,000 flasks from 
Almaden, on condition that the price was around 
200 dollars, although the purchase did not go ahead 
when the USA entered the war69. From then on, ex-
ports to Japan, which had been the largest buyer of 
Spanish mercury up to Pearl Harbor, became increas-
ingly complicated, but not so much for problems of 
transport but for problems with payments70. Note the 
important figures in the table below for exports to 
Portugal, a county whose industry had no mercury 
needs. It seems clear that these shipments ended up 
in the hands of the allied countries71.
In short, the early years of the Second World 
War marked the highpoint of the cartel’s activity. 
66  During the negotiations the Reichstellefuer Metalla 
tried to decide itself the price, but was opposed by the cartel. 
Neither was the Reichstelle successful in including in the 
contract that any disputes would be settled in a Berlin court. 
Instead, this would fall to those of Madrid or Rome. 
67  Perhaps as compensation to the Germans, the com-
mittee decided to grant the German’s request, which was in-
sisted on by the Italians, to reduce the price to 200 dollars the 
flask, in spite of the protests by some high ranking members of 
the Spanish Government.
68  The sources consulted only detail Spanish figures, al-
though it has been confirmed that Italian sales were even more 
geared towards the Third Reich, as they had no other markets. 
69 AFA, R-15/527, ME Spanish group Minutes, Vol. 6, 
sessions of October 30, 1941.
70  In August 1942 an offer from Japan to purchase 
20,000 flasks had to be ruled out because half the payment was 
offered in gold. And there was no guarantee that this could be 
delivered.
71  To these figures for Portugal must be added some 
lesser ones that nevertheless were a cause for concern for Al-
maden, since they were smuggled into Portugal and came from 
sales to Spanish industries that were not bound by the cartel.
Almadenand the Italian mines maximized profits, 
reaching record sales in 1940 (98,199 flasks) and re-
cord productions in 1941 and 1942 for Italy (94,230 
and 94,161 flasks) and Spain (86,473 and 72,288 
flasks72). This did not mean that Spain sold below its 
quota in these years, since in 1942 the Italian group 
compensated the Spanish for the deficits of the two 
previous years by increasing its stock (see graph 
7).Italian had a strong interest in keeping good bi-
lateral relations because they knew that the dissolu-
tion of the cartel would have given the opportunity to 
Almaden to sell tom Germany at 70-80 US dollars, 
what now Italian, with the Spanish permission, were 
selling at 200 US dollars73.
In 1943, the advances by the allied front in It-
aly supposed further difficulties for the cartel’s activ-
ities, as had occurred during the Spanish Civil War, 
but formally ME continued to function. In August, 
1943 the last meeting of the cartel was held until af-
ter the war in the Hotel Baur au Lac de Zurich. As of 
then, the partners began to have less and less infor-
mation about each other’s dealings, and what arrived 
was by letter or telegram, since the Italians were un-
able to get visas to visit Switzerland. Thus, in 1943 
the Italian group declared sales of 19,797 flasks, al-
though the Spanish suspected there was fraud on the 
part of their Monte Amiata partners, since they had 
evidence of sales of 42,800 flasks in total, and could 
hardly believe that the difference was accounted for 
by domestic consumption alone74. In any case, as the 
months went by, Spain felt freer and freer to impose 
its own price policies75.
The situation in Almaden was the reverse with 
sales grinding to a halt in June 1944. The mine did 
not sell a single flask that month or the next and the 
figure for the whole year was a meager 343 flasks76. 
72  Unfortunately, a good part of the increase in Spanish 
production figures was down to use of political prisoners in 
the Almadenmines during these years.
73 Archives Finmeccanica, Monte Amiata minutes of 
the BoD, 6.11.1941.
74 AFA, R-15/527, ME Spanish group Minutes, vol. 6, 
Session May 12, 1944.
75 AFA, R-15/527, ME Spanish group Minutes, vol. 6, 
Session October 19, 1944
76 Specifically, 200 for Germany, 15 for Sweden, 50 
for Portugal and 78 for Finland. The Almaden production for 
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The messages sent to the Italians at the end of the 
year all pointed towards a reduction in the official 
price as soon as possible77. The Italian response was 
an emphatic no, since it needed funds to restore the 
lamentable state of its mines after their destruction 
by the retreating German troops.
6.-The Cartel is dead. Long life to the cartel?
 The first days of 1945 saw a series of meetings 
in Madrid between USA Embassy staff and Almaden 
directors. These would suppose a turning point in 
the mercury export policy of the Spanish govern-
ment and also in the structure of the world mercury 
market. The American Government was already pre-
paring a program of massive purchases and stock-
building of mercury which would affect the market 
over the coming decades, and it was openly sound-
ing out Spain now that the latter had lost its business 
links with Germany. The situation in the USA was 
complex; the general slump in international prices 
had pushed their mines to the verge of a collapse. 
Most of them were by now incapable of operating 
at below $200, while the New York price was barely 
holding at $100. But the country needed to buy more, 
and evidently at a lower price than the cartel was de-
manding. The situation was probably also influenced 
those years was 33,846 flasks.
77 AFA, R-15/527, ME Spanish group Minutes, vol. 6, 
Session of November 1, 1944.
by the fact that the Allies found 45-50.000 flasks in 
Germany once they occupied the country in 194578. 
During the various meetings the experts exchanged 
information and the Spanish Government recognized 
to the American Embassy a stock of unsold mercury 
of 89,754 flasks at the end of 194479.From then on, 
sales to the USA began to pick up and, even before 
the war ended, it had become the largest importer of 
Spanish mercury.
In August 1945 ME had its first formal direc-
tors’ meeting for more than two years. The aim was 
to rebuild the sales structure and generate a new sales 
policy in line with the circumstances. The price of 
$100 was by then seen as being unrealistic, but $80 
was not, and so the war market period was at an end. 
 
 The minutes of the management committee 
are scant on information for the period, referring 
mainly to the negotiations to renew the cartel agree-
ment, which were concluded in August 1946. Just as 
in 1934, the new agreement that extended the part-
nership to all the small outsider mines of Spain and 
Italy. Thus, Almaden was joined by the Compañía 
78 Archives Finmeccanica, Monte Amiata minutes of 
the BoD, 26.3.1946.
79 AFA, R-15/528, ME Spanish group Minutes, vol. 7, 




Graph 6:  Mercurio Europeo sales and gross earnings, 1929-1943. 
 
Source: AFA, ME Managing Committee and Spanish Group minutes, 
1928-1943. 
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Mercurio Astur (Oviedo), the Mina San José (Alm-
ería) and Cinabrios de España (Badajoz), and in Italy 
the companies Argus (Milan) and SIAM (Rome) 
joined Monte Amiata and Siele. Idria, now in the Yu-
goslavian territory, were no longer in the agreement. 
The quotas continued to be of greater weight than the 
Spanish production80.
 
In the same year discussions started to find 
a new exclusive agent. For the Italian group Anglo-
Foreign Securities, later renamed Transalpina, based 
in Zurich, was offering the best conditions (the three-
year contract was for 65,000 flasks per year, with a 
commission of 4.5% up to 30,000, 5.5 to 40,000, and 
5.5 above that number). Almaden directors were re-
luctant to accept an Italian firm as sole seller81, but 
finally agreed. However, Transalpine was not able to 
get the 600,000 USD deposit/guarantee established 
in the contract82, so ME was forced temporarily to 
recuperate the old system of multiple representatives 
80  The system chosen for the mercury distribution was 
again through commission agents, but the documents con-
sulted do not allow for any conclusive analysis of the results. 
In 1948 there was a return to the idea of the sales office.
81 Archives Finmeccanica, Monte Amiata minutes of 
the BoD, 12.10.1946. ME received other proposals from Pick-
ering and Roura&Forgas.
82 AFA, R-13/520, ME Managing Committee minutes, 
Vol. 6 Sessions of December 7-8, 1946.
by regions.
In 1948, the two members of the cartel dis-
cussed the possibility of establishing a central sales 
bureau in Paris or in Zurich, but the Spanish group 
opposed for domestic political reasons (the replace-
ment of the Minister of Finance, and the need to 
appoint a new chairman in Almaden and a director 
general for the new sales office favorably known to 
any possible candidate for that political position)83. 
But the new events that occurred some months later 
made it impossible to reach an agreement between 
the two members of the cartel
Despite the doubts in the system of repre-
sentatives and the weakness of the sales, the market 
was offering good opportunities to both the groups. 
In 1948 the cartel was able to sell 113,583 flasks 
(85,117 the Spanish Group and  28,466 the Italian 
one)84Prices were again at a managing level for both 
groups, while Italian accepted the idea of some com-
pensation for Almaden, such as the exclusive sales of 
10,000 flasks to Imperial Chemical in 194885. In this 
83  NARA, RG 59, 865.602/7-2388.
84 ACS, ASIRI, b. 520, notes for the meeting of the 
board of director of the Monte Amiata, 10.2.1949
85 AFA, R-13/520, ME Managing Committee minutes, 
Table 5: Almaden mercury purchasers in 1943.
Source: AFA, R-15/527, ME Spanish group Minutes, Vol. 6, sessions 
of February 1, 1943 and February 3, 1944.
In brackets sales in 1942.Including a sale of 5 flasks to Denmark.
Country Number of 
flasks
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context, the American Government requested from 
the cartel the sale of 80,000 flasks at a maximum 
price of $75, and preferably at $70, to which the car-
tel replied confirming that it could immediately sell 
up to 100,000 flasks at those prices This spelt the 
beginning of negotiations that would continue dur-
ing the spring of 194986. The US administration also 
insisted very much on opening a new central sales 
office in Zurich, which the Italian were very much 
in favor of, while the Spanish government was much 
less enthusiastic87.
All seemed ready when the Spanish group 
learnt through the American press of the massive de-
liveries of Italian mercury to the USA. It was finally 
confirmed that they had sold in April 1949 the whole 
order at $70 the flask without taking into consider-
ation the Spanish part. There followed protests to the 
committee of directors and to the highest levels of 
both governments, at a time when other diplomatic 
conflicts, which were unrelated, were in full swing. 
Vol. 6 Sessions, meeting of 28.5.1948.
86 AFA, R-15/520, ME Managing Committee 
minutes,Vol. 8 Sessions of April 2-5, 1949.
87 NARA, RG 59, 865.602/7-2348.
The Italian Government claimed that the sales had 
been made under the Marshall Plan - «a special and 
secret sale» had been defined in a meeting of Monte 
Amiata board of directors –made in the framework 
of the US strategic stockpiling, which would not af-
fect in any case the market, an opinion that Spain 
clearly did not share88.
US administration, that in principle was 
fighting against any cartel and restrictive business 
restrictive practices as a pillar of the new interna-
tional economic order89, remained neutral in the 
controversy. Nevertheless it discreetly offered the 
Italian government some information about sales by 
Almaden out of the cartel in 1950: 45,000 under the 
British-Spanish trade agreement; 40,000 to Global 
Trading Co. of Lichtenstein (a company working for 
the Soviet government), and 7,000 to an American 
88  Archives Finmeccanica, Monte Amiata minutes of 
the BoD, 13.9.1949; ACS, ASIRI, b. 520, note for the minis-
try of Foreign Affairs, 6.3.1952.For a full description of the 
process, see Hierro de Lecea (2009).




Graph 7: Official mercury prices in New York, London, and Mercurio 
Europeo average gross prices ($/Flask) 
 
Source: AFA, ME Managing Committee minutes, 1928-1945, and United 
States Tariff Commission. Mercury. Washington, 1944, p. 15. 
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buyer90. This cross information greatly reduced the 
space for Spanish legal complaints despite the fact 
that officially the Spanish government announced its 
intention to ask the Italian to pay a fee of 47 million 
USD, according to article 5 of the cartel agreement. 
But the Swiss tribunal never took a decision, because 
the Spanish government never registered the original 
agreement of 1928, an operation which would have 
cost in 1949-50 about 5 million USD91.
Once it became clear that the all these tacti-
cal moves were just for better positioning in view of 
a new agreement, the member of the cartel started 
negotiations92, that were completed by 1954, when a 
secret agreement started to operate, and a new more 
formal one was to be signed in 1958. Meanwhile, 
Italians had already accepted to compensate the 
Spanish for the 1949 sale to USA with 812 million 
lire or 1.3 million USD and the exclusive right for 
Spain to sell Mercury to the USA for a year, up to a 
equivalent of 8.3 million USD. Only EEC antitrust 
regulations  finally out an end to the cartel in 196393.
7.- Conclusions
 The current state of the research allows us to 
put forward some conclusions that are much more 
than just provisional.
90 NARA, RG 59, 865.602/7-2348.
91 ACS, ASIRI, b. 520, note for the ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 6.3.1952
92  For a new cartel Spain demanded that Italy ceased all 
exports until Almaden had sold 130,400 flasks abroad, along 
with an immediate payment $1,277,920 for the difference in 
price between the ME agreed price and the actual sales price 
or if not, the reception of 28,000 flasks of mercury (Minutes of 
the Spanish Sales Committee, January 27, 1950).
93  AFA, R-15/527, Comité Exterior de ventas, Vol. 
2, August 30, 1954.  See also Segreto (1991), p. 164, and 
MacKie-Mason and Pindyck (1987), p. 193.
 The study of the mercury issue is an example 
of a tremendously varied internal organization of a 
cartel for a single product and for a relatively short 
period.
  In general terms it is shown that a general 
knowledge of a sector is not a guarantee for exports, 
even when there is an almost absolute duopoly with-
out an accompanying efficient sales network. The 
Experience of the Mercurio Europeo sales office in 
the first stages of the cartel shows that without such 
a network and without minimum flexibility in prices, 
it is impossible to generate any sales policy.
Nevertheless, the delegation of sales proved 
to be a much more operative system, although only 
when it was exercised by a single seller, as in the 
case of Roura & Forgas (1932-1939) or Metallges-
sellschaft (1941-1942). In contrast, the system of 
representatives did not work, since there was not 
enough agility nor sufficient incentives. A fair part of 
the failure was due here to the impossibility of nego-
tiating prices with a certain amount of flexibility in 
the middle of an economic crisis, something which 
Roura & Forgas had done when acting as sole ven-
dor. So it is confirmed that maintaining artificially 
high and fixed prices is an error in this type of cartel, 
especially when there is a fall in demand, however 
small the participation of outsiders in the market may 
be. In short, this policy can only be justified under 
extraordinary conditions, such as occurred during the 
Second World War and when there are no real market 
alternatives.
Table 6: Quotas in the ME 1946 agreement 
Spanish Group Italian Group
Up to 65,000 flasks 61.50% 38.50%
65,000 to 80,0000 61.75% 38.25%
Above 80,000 62.00% 38.00%
Source:AFA, R-15/519, ME Managing Committee minutes, Volume 7, sessions of May 20-
31, 1946.
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Apart from the pure sale dynamics, Mercurio 
Europeo is a historical refutation of the theoretical 
approaches from Stigler (1964) and his followers, 
while cooperation between Spanish and Italian mines 
won out in a long period against the temptation of 
either to monopolize the market (21 years, or 35 if 
we consider the cartel operation till 1962). The level 
of concentration in the mercury industry contributed 
to the agreement, but the cartel also showed some 
disequilibrium in cost and size between the partners. 
The strategy of cheating or excluding the Italian 
mines, through a sharpreduction of prices, was al-
ways in the hands of Almaden, but over the long-
term, both earned more by cooperating than from 
competing. In addition, the cartel worked, in spite of 
the prevailing instability in the economic situation at 
the time, with an international economic depression, 
a civil war in Spain and the WW2. Mercurio Europe 
was, therefore, one of the longest, most successful 
and most persistent examples of a Cartel in the his-
Table 7: List of MercurioEuropeo representatives/Commisionist, 1946-49.





















Phillipp Brothers Inc. 
(N.Y.)
United States 2% 1,000
Impex (Paris)











Central and South 
America 2% 300
ChematarInc (N.Y.) Soviet Union 2,5% -
Cotadoria Nacional de 
Pelo (Madeira)
Portugal 5% 200
Source: AFA, R-15/528, ME Spanish group Minutes, vol. 7, Sessions December 12, 1946 and 13 
February 13, 1947.
tory of modern mining; and was also at odds with the 
European trend that, following Schröter (1996 and 
1997), saw the sudden disappearance of cartels from 
1945.
 In the case of both patterns in the agreement, 
the role of State as entrepreneur was pretty positive, 
contrary to the negative view of some authors on 
State Owned Enterprises in mining94, at least from 
a marketing point of view. The training process in 
marketing skills, after decades of working through 
intermediaries, was a substantial success in the long 
run. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the interference 
of the Spanish and Italian Governments was, in some 
cases, clearly a hindrance to the smooth running of 
the cartel; for example, as occurred in the defenestra-
tion for political reasons of the cartel’s proven best 
sales agent (Roura & Forges), the meddling in the 
94  Radenski (1989), p. 49-53.
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sales policies of the Spanish Government in 1940 
or the lack of coordination in the 1949 sale to the 
USA Governments that caused the cartel to cease for 
around five years. In the end it appears quite clear 
that an active role of the State in establishing and 
governing the cartel is no guarantee for a more ra-
tional conduct of the business. Both the Spanish and 
the Italian governments were more interested in the 
defense of their respective national interests than in 
offering a “superior” rationality to the imperfections 
of the market and the strategies of the firms involved 
in the agreement. The result of such behaviors was 
more a stabilization of the social aspects of the mer-
cury production than a real long term solution to the 
old and new problems of this sector.
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Appendix
1: MercurioEuropeo main purchasers, October 1928 to April 1934 (Accumulated figures):
USA Flasks




International Mini. Metl 2,600




















Imperial Chemical Ind 300
China
Mitsubishi 600








Imperial Chemical Industry 200
John Batt  & Co 100
Source: AFA, R-15/516, ME Managing Committee minutes, Volume 4, p66-67
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Appendix
2. United states mercury consumption for main uses:
1928 1943
Use Quantity Ratio % Quantity Ratio %
Chemical preparations 7,486 21.4
Pharmaceuticals 5,493 15.7 14,563.0 26.7
Dental preparations 362 1.0 556.0 1.0
Fulminate 6,587 18.9 * *
Agriculture 365 1.0 1,632.0 3.0
Vermillon 2,450 7.0 * *
Antifouling paint * * 2,702.0 5.0
Felt 1,720 4.9 -
As a Catalyst or in the electro-
lytic preparation of Chlorine 
and Caustic soda
1,000 2.9 5,123.0 9.4
Electrical apparatus 2,556 7.3 3,284.0 6.0
Industrial control of instru-
ments 2,996 8.6 3,674.0 6.7
Amalgamation 453 1.3 24.0 0.0
General laboratory use 628 1.8 360.0 0.7
Redestilled - 5,384.0 9.9
Others 2,846 8.1 15,854.0 29.1
Unaccounted for - 1,344.0 2.5
Total 34,942 100.0 54,500.0 100.0
Source: United States Tariff Commission.  Mercury. Washington, 1944, p. 6.
      * Included under “Others”
